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COMMENTS
ZONING LAW: ARCHITECTURAL APPEARANCE
ORDINANCES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
"If we want our children to grow up in pleasant purlieus, we must
give up some.., of the freedom of the individual to use his land as
he chooses."1
I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1946, the Village of Fox Point, Wisconsin,2
passed a local ordinance that stated:
No building permit ... shall be issued unless it has been found...
by the building board.., that the exterior architectural appeal and
functional plan of the proposed structure will, when erected, not be
so at variance with either the exterior architectural appeal and func-
tional plan of the structures already constructed or in the course of
construction in the immediate neighborhood or the character of the
applicable district ... as to cause a substantial depreciation in the
property values of said neighborhood .... I
1. J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 218, 236 (1955).
2. The Village of Fox Point, incorporated in 1926, is an approximately two and one-half
square mile suburb on the North Shore of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. State ex rel. Saveland Park
Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 265, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841
(1955). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin described it as a "highly desirable residential village,
almost entirely built up of single family residences." Id.
3. Fox PoINT, WiS., ORDINANCE 129, § I (1946), quoted in Wieland, 269 Wis. at 265, 69
N.W.2d at 219. The full text of Section I reads as follows:
No building permit for any structure for which a building permit is required shall be issued
unless it has been found as a fact by the building board by at least a majority vote, after a
view of the site of the proposed structure, and an examination of the application papers for
a building permit, which shall include exterior elevations of the proposed structure, that
the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the proposed structure will, when
erected, not be so at variance with either the exterior architectural appeal and functional
plan of the structures already constructed or in the course of construction in the immediate
neighborhood or the character of the applicable district established by Ordinance No. 117
[the general zoning ordinance of the village], or any ordinance amendatory thereof or sup-
plementary thereto, as to cause a substantial depreciation in the property values of said
neighborhood within said applicable district.
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Eight years later, a local relator in Fox Point applied for a building permit
to erect a single family residence.4 The village architectural review board
denied the permit on the grounds that the proposed structure's exterior ar-
chitectural appeal and functional plan were so at variance with other homes
in the immediate neighborhood that substantial depreciation in property
values would result if the proposed home were built.' On appeal to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the relator challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinance on several grounds. The most significant question presented
was whether the objectives of the village ordinance fell within the state's
police power to promote the general welfare of the community.6
Citing a recent United States Supreme Court decision,7 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in a ground breaking decision, State ex rel. Saveland
Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,' upheld the ordinance. The court recog-
nized that the state's police power had developed to the point that aesthetic9
considerations would be sufficient to justify the exercise of police power."l
In the name of protecting the public's general welfare, the court denied the
4. Wieland, 269 Wis. at 264, 69 N.W.2d at 217.
5. Id. at 264, 69 N.W.2d at 217. For a detailed description of a proposed permit that was
rejected by an Ohio board, see infra note 46.
6. Wieland, 269 Wis. at 266-67, 69 N.W.2d at 219-20.
7. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (sustaining a District of Columbia urban renewal
ordinance despite a Fifth Amendment challenge).
8. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
9. "Aesthetics," or as it is sometimes spelled, "esthetics," has been defined as "what is, or is
not, pleasing to the sense of sight." Norman Williams, Scenic Protection as a Legitimate Goal of
Public Regulation, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1990). For a comprehensive look
at the definitional problems associated with "aesthetics," see James P. Karp, The Evolving Mean-
ing of Aesthetics in Land-Use Regulation, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 307 (1990). One author, how-
ever, cited two studies that refute the common belief that aesthetic evaluations are too subjective
for a consensus to be reached. Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1438, 1442-43 (1973).
Justice Stewart may have best stated the problem of defining aesthetics when he said in an-
other context: "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (referring to pornography).
J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., defined aesthetics as: "2. Of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism
of the beautiful. 3. Of persons, animals: Having or showing an appreciation of the beautiful or
pleasing; tasteful, of refined taste. Of things: In accordance with the principals of good taste (or
what is conventionally regarded as such)." Dukeminier, supra note 1, at 219 n.2 (citing OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 148 (1933)).
John J. Costonis offers this definition: "'Aesthetics,' as the term is used in the visual beauty
rationale, connotes pleasure or offense to the sense of sight resulting from the visual form of
environmental features or settings." John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Refor-
mulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REv. 355, 396 (1982).
10. Wieland, 269 Wis. at 266-67, 69 N.W.2d at 222. The Wisconsin court upheld the ordi-
nance primarily on the ground that protection of property values is within the state's power to
promote the general welfare of the village. Id.
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landowner's opportunity to construct a home because a local architectural
appearance review board had deemed that the proposed home's appearance
would lower property values in the community.
This Comment examines a hypothetical scenario: What if the land-
owner in Wieland had challenged Fox Point's ordinance on the grounds
that the appearance and design of a home is protected speech under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution? This Comment argues
that although a free speech challenge to an architectural appearance review
ordinance is plausible, it inevitably would fail. Section II provides a brief
background on zoning law before exploring the history and present status
of aesthetics generally and architectural appearance regulation specifically.
Section III examines whether architecture falls under the protection of the
First Amendment by determining who would have standing to challenge an
architectural appearance ordinance and under what classification of speech
or expression architecture might fall.
Assuming that architecture would be afforded protected speech status,
Section IV determines which test might be used to review governmental
restrictions on architectural expression. Architectural appearance ordi-
nances are analyzed under a content-neutral time, place, and manner re-
striction test. Using this test, the justifications for architectural appearance
regulation are explored. Then, the significant governmental interests in re-
stricting architecture are weighed. Finally, alternative communication
channels for architectural expression are examined. This Comment con-
cludes that although freedom of speech is a fundamental right, the interests
of communities in protecting their residents from the secondary effects of
architectural expression justify the use of architectural appearance
regulations.
II. THE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER THROUGH ARCHITECTURAL
APPEARANCE REVIEW REGULATION: A BACKGROUND
A. Zoning in General
Regulation through zoning1' or other land use controls is an exercise of
the state police power limited by procedural and substantive due process
concerns. To regulate under this power, a state or municipality must pro-
mote those "public goods" that are legitimate objectives and within the per-
11. The terms "zoning," "control," "regulation," and "limits" will be used interchangeably
in this Comment.
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missible scope of the state's interest. 2 The specific authority for local
governments to zone is derived from state zoning statutes that typically pro-
vide: "'[S]uch regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration,
among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitabil-
ity for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such
municipality.' ,13
Traditionally, courts have been permissive of land use regulations. 4
Even during the Lochner v. New York 15 era, the United States Supreme
Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 6 held that zoning laws are
a valid exercise of the police power to promote the public welfare despite
the effect these laws have on the rights of individuals to use their property.
The Court deferred to the legislature's judgment and presumed that this
type of legislative enactment was constitutional. 7
Through its holding in Euclid, the Supreme Court gave the "green
light" to local governments to enact ordinances regulating for appearance
or aesthetic purposes.' 8 "The significance of Euclid was the introduction
into zoning considerations of the concept of 'utilitarianism,' which balances
individual interests against the general welfare of the community."' 9 The
12. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Samuel Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Be-
holder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation,. 48 UMKC L. REV. 125,
128-30 (1980).
13. Bruce A. Rubin, Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28
STAN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1975) (citation and footnote omitted). The State of Wisconsin's statute is
nearly identical. Id. at 180 n.7; see also WIs. STAT. §§ 59.97, 60.61 (1991-92); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Robert M. Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 26, 48-49 (1960-61); Rubin, supra, at 180 n.5.
14. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (Landowner lost appeal after land
classification changed by zoning law from brick yard to residential use.). In Hadacheck, the
Court recognized the lower court's presumption of validity for the legislative act of zoning. Id. at
409.
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (employing economic substantive due process theory to actively scruti-
nize state regulation of property and contract rights).
16. 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395 (1926) (upholding validity of zoning because classifications used
were "fairly debatable" and not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable").
17. Id. at 367; see Ralph Artigliere, Comment, Freedom of Expression in the Land Use Plan-
ning Context: Preserving the Barrier of Presumptive Validity, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 954, 964-65 &
n.65, 967 & n.82, 982 n.191 (1976).
18. Russell P. Schropp, Comment, The Reasonableness ofAesthetic Zoning in Florida: A Look
Beyond the Police Power, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 441 (1982).
Legislatures at all levels of government have passed regulations ranging from Congress's at-
tempts to preserve old Georgetown, to Louisiana's state constitutional protection of New Orle-
ans's French Quarter, to Philadelphia's municipal council's regulation of its historic political sites.
Anderson, supra note 13, at 26-27 & nn.8-10.
19. Sheldon E. Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Decision Process,
35 Mo. L. REV. 176, 177-78 (1970).
ZONING LAW
only substantive condition on this new zoning power was stated in a subse-
quent decision. The Court explicitly re-emphasized that the police power to
regulate the character of an individual's use of his land was not unlimited,
but rather was required to "bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare."' However, the Supreme Court then
avoided controversial zoning issues for almost forty years," forcing the
states to define the limits of the public's general welfare.2"
B. Zoning for the General Welfare: Aesthetics
Although zoning affects the appearance of a community, traditional
land use regulations such as density, height, or size requirements do not
necessarily protect a community from aesthetic problems.23 Some com-
mentators have argued that traditional regulations alone exert more influ-
ence upon a home's design than the architect;24 yet, after Euclid, more and
more communities continued to go beyond traditional zoning to ensure
community control over the appearance of their neighborhoods.2 5 Zoning
out a proposed design is less costly than providing just compensation for the
land involved. The government always has the option of using the state's
eminent domain power to achieve an aesthetically pleasing environment,
subject, of course, to the Takings Clause.26 However, communities have
preferred to use zoning laws to achieve aesthetic goals such as architectural
appearance.27
Initially, the courts were openly hostile to zoning that was based even
partially on aesthetic considerations.28 One court declared: "Aesthetic con-
20. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (emphasis added).
21. Norman Williams & Holly Ernst, Commentary, And Now We Are Here on a Darkling
Plain, 13 VT. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989) ("Starting in 1974, the Supreme Court suddenly re-entered
the field of planning law, and since then has decided about twenty cases, more than one per
year.").
22. Id. at 665 (indicating that by 1974, state courts decided nearly 12,000 zoning cases).
23. Anderson, supra note 13, at 26.
24. Id. at 26 & n.1 (citing Eli Goldston & James H. Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential
Developments, 73 HARV. L. REV. 241, 243 (1959)).
25. Theodore Guberman, Comment, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URB. L. ANN. 295, 295 (1976)
("Zoning restrictions on the private use and enjoyment of property for the benefit of the commu-
nity are employed virtually everywhere in this country today."); see also infra note 46 (offering
particular examples of architectural appearance zoning).
26. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (sustaining a District of Columbia urban re-
newal ordinance against a Fifth Amendment challenge). Another option for the government or a
private party is a nuisance law approach. See infra note 54.
27. See infra note 44.
28. John E. Van Vlear, Comment, Land Use Aesthetics: A Citizen Survey Approach to Decision
Making, 15 PEPP. L. REv. 207, 215 (1988); see, e.g., People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278 (N.Y.
1963) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
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siderations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity,
and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to
take private property without compensation." 9 Because the belief was that
"beauty is in the eye of the beholder," regulations that were based solely
upon aesthetic considerations were usually held invalid.30  Those courts
that were not openly hostile to aesthetics usually relied upon nonaesthetic
reasons for upholding regulations grounded in aesthetic motivation. 3I The
most popular nonaesthetic general welfare justification was, and still is, the
protection of property value.3 a Other justifications relied upon by the
courts include promotion of tourism or protection of public health and
safety.3 3 If a rationalization other than aesthetics could be found, the
courts tended to use it.
After the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,34 lower
courts began to uphold zoning regulations on aesthetic grounds alone.35 In
dictum, the Court unequivocally expanded the definition of general welfare
to include aesthetics:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
29. City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905), cited in Van
Vlear, supra note 28, at 214 & n.33.
30. Van Vlear, supra note 28, at 215; see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Zoning-Aesthetic
Considerations, 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968 & Supp. 1993); see also Highway 100 Auto Wreckers,
Inc. v. West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 651a, 97 N.W.2d 423, 424 (1959).
31. Michael Pace, Note, Aesthetic Regulation: A New General Rule, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 581,
582-83 (1987).
A classic example of such reasoning is in St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 137 S.W. 929 (Mo. 1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). The court upheld a
billboard regulation, stating, "The signboards... endanger the public health, promote immoral-
ity, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all classes of miscreants." Id. at 942.
32. Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General Wel-
fare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603, 622 (1981); see, e.g., State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 264, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
Subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions have followed the Wisconsin court's lead. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of
Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
33. Rowlett, supra note 32, at 633, 635; see also Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (uphold-
ing a height restriction designed to serve architectural symmetry purposes as a fire-control mea-
sure); Thomas Crumplar, Comment, Architectural Controls: Aesthetic Regulation of the Urban
Environment, 6 URB. LAW. 622, 624-25 (1974) ("[C]ourts . . . uphold even blatant aesthetic
regulations as long as the slightest connection [can] be made to the traditional police powers of
health, safety, and public morality.").
34. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
35. Bufford, supra note 12, at 126; Pace, supra note 31, at 584; Van Vlear, supra note 28, at
216-17.
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the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.36
A more positive reaction to aesthetics emerged after Berman. Courts
increasingly upheld regulations based only partially on nonaesthetic con-
cerns, usually including aesthetic considerations as dicta.37 The Wieland
decision is a classic example of this approach.38
Gradually, aesthetics as a sufficient justification grew in acceptance. To-
day, a majority of states allow land use regulation justified solely by aes-
thetic considerations.39 Wisconsin explicitly joined the majority in 1968."0
The remaining states are either undecided or require more than a pure aes-
thetic basis in order to exercise the police power.4" In 1984, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed aesthetics as a proper basis for the exercise
36. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court's decision did
not address a state's power to zone under the police power since the case arose under federal
jurisdiction and concerned the eminent domain power. Id. However, the Court's rationale has
been utilized in many police power exercise cases. See, e.g., Wieland, 269 Wis. at 62, 69 N.W.2d at
217.
37. See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 198 A.2d 447 (N.J. 1964)
(holding that aesthetics is relevant zoning consideration).
38. Wieland, 269 Wis. at 264, 69 N.W.2d at 219. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stressed that
the protection of property values was an objective that properly pursued the general welfare of the
community rationale. Id. at 267, 69 N.W.2d at 222. The court reasoned that any depreciation in
the property values of a limited area of the community necessarily adversely affected the general
welfare of the entire community. Id.
39. See Bufford, supra note 12, at 131-64 (The article analyzed all 50 states' positions on
aesthetic-based zoning in 1980. Sixteen states authorized regulation based on aesthetics alone,
while nine had not recognized aesthetics as a sole basis of zoning, and another 16 states remained
undecided); Karp, supra note 9, at 313 n.35 ("In the ten years since [Bufford's] article was written
even more states have adopted the majority rule.... [T]hirty-one states have either held or indi-
cated strongly in dicta that aesthetics can stand alone."); Pace, supra note 31, at 584 (indicating
that more jurisdictions have authorized regulation based solely on aesthetics); see also Russ Ver-
Steeg, Iguanas, Toads and Toothbrushes: Land-Use Regulation ofArt as Signage, 25 GA. L. REV.
437, 437 n.1 (1991) ("The cases and literature discussing the judicial acceptance of aesthetic zon-
ing as a constitutionally permissible objective are now literally voluminous."); Ghent, supra note
30.
40. Racine County v. Plourde, 38 Wis. 2d 403, 157 N.W.2d 591 (1968) (preserving a pleasant
view from a roadway fell within the public's interest and general welfare). The court stated that
"we are cognizant that aesthetic considerations alone may now be sufficient to justify a prohibited
use in a zoning ordinance." Id. at 412, 157 N.W.2d at 595.
41. See supra note 39. But see Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can't Build That Here: The Con-
stitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1013 (1990).
The author asserts that "[clurrently, twelve states do not permit zoning based solely on aesthetics
while eleven states allow zoning based on aesthetic factors alone." Id. at 1014-15 (citations omit-
ted). The author, however, fails to cite many significant recent state decisions. See id. at 1014-15
nn. 11-13. Regarding Wisconsin, for example, the author cites Wieland, but fails to recognize any
case since 1955, particularly Racine County v. Plourde. Id. at 1014-16 nn. 1-15.
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of state police power for the general welfare in City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent.42
C. Architectural Appearance Zoning in Particular
The Court's acceptance of the importance of aesthetics-based zoning
generally coincided with increased legislation in the architectural appear-
ance area. By 1974, a mere twenty years after Berman, at least 150 jurisdic-
tions were using architectural controls to regulate historical districts,43 and
over 500 municipalities had authorized architectural design review boards
to regulate on a community-wide basis.'
Typically, architectural appearance review ordinances control the archi-
tectural appearance of residential homes by limiting "excessive dissimilar-
ity" or "similarity.' 44 They usually require "conformity" or "harmony"
with the community's "existing" or even "desired" architecture.46 The
42. 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) ("It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its
police powers to advance [a]esthetic values."); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("[No] substantial doubt [exists] that the twin goals
that the ordinance seeks to further-traffic safety and the appearance of the city-are substantial
governmental goals.") (citation omitted). Justice Brennan's concurring opinion did not disagree
with this statement. Brennan assumed that the "twin goals" were substantial interests of the state,
but found that in this case San Diego failed to show that the ordinance was part of a comprehen-
sive plan to make the city more attractive. Id. at 531-33 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. Crumplar, supra note 33, at 622.
44. Id.; see also RICHARD F. BABCOCK, BILLBOARDS, GLASS HousES, AND THE LAW AND
OTHER LAND USE FABLES (1977) (offering detailed examples); Samuel E. Poole III, Architectural
Appearance Review Regulations and the First Amendment: The Good, the Bad, and the Consensus
Ugly, 19 URB. LAW. 287, 289-90 (1987).
Two Wisconsin communities, Wauwatosa and Whitefish Bay, were among the first in the
United States to enact architectural review boards in 1945. Poole, supra, at 290 n.10. By 1949, 40
communities utilized such boards, see id., and 17 of these communities, including Wauwatosa and
Whitefish Bay, were profiled in American Society of Planning Officials. Id.
45. See Annette B. Kolis, Note, Architectural Expression: Police Power and the First Amend-
ment, 16 URB. L. ANN. 273, 275 n.8 (1979) (citing Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia
Fields, 244 N.E.2d 369, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)); see also Rubin, supra note 13, at 179.
46. See, e.g., BABCOCK, supra note 44 (offering specific examples of "harmony," "desired,"
"character of neighborhood," "similarity," and "dissimilarity"). Babcock mentions, for example,
that an ordinance in Greenfield, Wisconsin requires buildings to be both not "so at variance with
nor so similar to either the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the structures
already constructed." Id. at 7.
For an excellent illustration of a proposal that was excessively dissimilar from its intended
neighborhood, see Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
The neighborhood of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, the site of Mrs. Reid's proposed structure,
featured homes that were "dignified, stately and conventional structures, two and one-half stories
high." Id. at 77. In contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court described Mrs. Reid's proposal as:
[A] flat-roofed complex of twenty modules, each of which is ten feet high, twelve feet
square and arranged in a loosely formed "U" which winds its way through a grove of trees.
About sixty per cent of the wall area of the house is glass and opens on an enclosed garden;
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usual method of implementation is through a board of architectural review.
These boards consider all proposed buildings in a jurisdiction and hold the
authority to disapprove a design and deny a building permit if the require-
ments of the ordinance are not met.47 The purposes for, effects from, and
motivations of architectural review do not necessarily coincide. Each spe-
cific purpose for architectural appearance review ordinances is related to
the general goal of maintaining an aesthetic environment.48 A dissimilarity
requirement seeks to avoid endless blocks of almost identical houses.4 9 A
similarity, conformity, or harmony prerequisite attempts to encourage some
homogeneity or identifiable character in a neighborhood. One goal of all
architectural appearance zoning in suburban areas is to protect the commu-
nity from the harmful side effects of inappropriate architecture. Municipal-
ities typically seek to avoid the widely held perception that identical box-
type homes, or a chaotic mix of inconsistent architectural designs and styles
will result in some harm (usually economic) to property owners in the
neighborhood."°
Both courts and legislatures have recognized that a community's archi-
tectural appearance, as well as its aesthetics in general, can make a powerful
impact on those in the community, whether a message is intentionally con-
the rest of the walls are of cement panels. A garage of the same modular construction
stands off from the house, and these two structures, with their associated garden walls,
trellises and courts, form a series of interior and exterior spaces, all under a canopy of trees
and baffled from the street by a garden wall.
A wall ten feet high is part of the front structure of the house and garage and extends
all around the garden area. It has no windows. Since the wall is of the same height as the
structure of the house, no part of the house can be seen from the street.
Id Accordingly, the court found the proposal structure to be unacceptable: "From all appear-
ances, [the proposal] is just a high wall with no indication of what is behind it. Not only does the
house fail to conform in any manner with the other buildings but presents no identification it is a
structure for people to live in." Id.
47. Kolis, supra note 45, at 276. Architectural review boards usually consist of three or more
residents of the municipality with most requiring or preferring at least one architect. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (board by ordinance composed of
three architects); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963)
(board composed of three architects); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269
Wis. 262, 265, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (board made up of three
village residents, two of whom were architects).
Others do not require any special training. See, e.g., LAKE FOREST, ILL., BUILDING CODE
CH. 9, § 9-107 (1979). In 1987, however, Lake Forest's board included an architect as chair, an
interior designer, an engineer, and a few other interested citizens. Poole, supra note 44, at 311.
48. See Poole, supra note 44, at 293 (tract housing); Regan, supra note 41, at 1019 n.35 (citing
examples of local New York ordinances); Rubin, supra note 13, at 179.
49. Regan, supra note 41, at 1019.
50. NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW
§ 71C.01, 57 (1988) ("Here, the prime consideration is not the pleasure of the residents or of
visitors; it is the enhancement of real estate values.").
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veyed or not.51 Architectural controls may reinforce a community's snob-
bish attitude, protect neighborhood real estate values, or merely have the
perceived effect of protecting a neighborhood's property and other "val-
ues."52 However, the motives behind architectural appearance ordinances
and the secondary intended effects are immaterial to the constitutionality of
the ordinances.5 3 In addition, the architecture of a community only conveys
a "message" when it is perceived by its residents and visitors. The clearest
example of the perception of the "message" of architecture is a structure
that rises to the level of nuisance.54 However, architectural appearance or-
dinances confront architecture that fails to rise to this level.
Architectural appearance ordinances have been challenged on many
grounds.55 Courts have rejected contentions that these ordinances exceed
the scope of their constitutional or statutory authority,5 6 unlawfully dele-
gate power to administrative architectural review boards,57 deprive land
5 1. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assumed that the proposed structure in Wie-
land would cause a substantial reduction in property value in the immediate area. See Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217. "[I]f an accurate method were formulated for measuring the effect
on the value of neighboring property caused by an obstruction of view or an unsightly use of land,
judicial non-recognition of the aesthetic nuisance action would be difficult to justify." George P.
Smith & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance,
15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 75 n.123 (1992). "According to one expert: '[There is] no lack of
data for making adjustments based on aesthetic factors. View and proximity to a noxious use are
just another variable in the marketplace the measurement of which is not more subjective than
many other factors commonly valued.' " Id. at. 77 & n. 130; see also Frank Michelman, Toward a
Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, PRAC. LAW., Feb. 1969, at 36, 37.
52. See Poole, supra note 44, at 294.
53. When the Court examines an architectural appearance ordinance to determine if it uncon-
stitutionally restricts First Amendment protected speech, the Court will not inquire into the mo-
tives of a municipality as long as it appears that the ordinance is genuinely based. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court
will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.").
For a comprehensive look at motives in zoning laws, see Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative
Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1988). Brownstein
asserts: "[U]nder current federal standards, motive inquiries are clearly irrelevant to the adjudica-
tion of substantive due process or equal protection challenges to the reasonableness of land use
regulations and first amendment actions directed against dispersal zoning laws." Id. at 123-24.
54. See Raymond R. Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Judi-
cial Attitudes, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 141 (1987). See generally Smith & Fernandez, supra note 51, at
53.
55. Kolis, supra note 45, at 284 & n.41 ("Procedural due process claims are.., unsuccessful
because adequate procedures in the review of architectural design are generally provided for by
municipalities.").
56. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Zoning-Regulation of Architectural Style, 41 A.L.R.3d
1397, 1401-03 (1972 & Supp. 1993).
57. Id. at 1406-07; see, e.g., State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
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owners of the equal protection of law,58 or are unconstitutionally vague.5 9
Whether these ordinances relate to the legitimate objectives of the police
power has been litigated with mixed results depending on the court's opin-
ion of whether aesthetics is a proper justification.6 °
Nevertheless, reported cases addressing the legitimacy of architectural
appearance regulation as a proper exercise of the police power are few in
number.61 Besides the increasing acceptance of aesthetics,62 several practi-
cal reasons account for the small number of reported cases concerning ar-
chitectural appearance. First, someone must be denied a permit before a
suit can be brought. Lake Forest, Illinois, for example, like many munici-
palities, uses negotiation to avoid denying a permit, and therefore avoid
litigation.3 Second, the potential costs of a legal battle with a wealthy
suburb may outweigh the benefits sought by a landowner who at most can
win a building permit.' Third, many landowners, builders, and developers
are concerned about the eventual resale of any home built;65 a pyramid-
shaped house, for instance, would be difficult to resell in any location. Fur-
thermore, most home buyers must still obtain financing from a conservative
58. Ghent, supra note 56, at 1407-08; see, e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389
P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964).
59. Ghent, supra note 56, at 1408-09; see, e.g., Novi v. City of Pacifica, 169 Cal. App. 3d 678,
215 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1985) (ordinance requiring "variety in architectural design" is not void for
vagueness). But see Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 150 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959) (holding denial of permit for flat-roofed residence unreasonable in light of existence of flat-
roofed homes and additions throughout municipality); City of W. Palm Beach v. State ex reL
Duffey, 30 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1947) (ordinance impermissibly vague).
60. Ghent, supra note 56, at 1403-06; see, e.g., Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d at 305; Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 389 P.2d at 13; State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 276, 69
N.W.2d 217, 224, cerL denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (all holding architectural control ordinances
valid); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199 (Va. 1975); City of W. Palm Beach v. State
ex rel. Duffey, 30 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1947).
61. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 43; Ghent, supra note 56, at 1399.
62. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
63. Poole, supra note 44, at 338. Lake Forest, Illinois, utilizes an architectural review board
with the power to deny a building permit. However, Lake Forest's experience has been not to
deny a permit, but rather to negotiate with landowners over points of disagreement. Id. Compare
Lake Forest to Ladue, Missouri, which allows appeal of a building permit denial to the city coun-
cil. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 179 n.4.
64. As Stephen Williams explained in reference to Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192
N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), Mrs. Reid "alone bore the costs of delay-her property lay idle,
her need for alternative housing dragged on, and construction costs might well have been rising
faster than her wealth." Stephen F. Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of
Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1977-78).
65. Poole, supra note 44, at 338-39 ("Community rejection is certainly one measure of market
response to design.").
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local bank.66 Fourth, people tend not to buy land in conservative suburban
areas like Fox Point or Lake Forest if they prefer radical architecture.67 In
addition, the community itself can intimidate a potential neighbor. The
hostility and resentment a landowner may feel after a controversial house is
built over strong objections and after a heated court battle financed by
neighborhood tax dollars is deterrence enough for some builders.68
Finally, another reason exists for the lack of litigation surrounding ar-
chitectural appearance regulations and the First Amendment: Many people
are unaware that these regulations may intrude upon a fundamental lib-
erty.69 Because architecture is functional, many do not view its regulation
as a free speech concern. 70 Nevertheless, these reasons do not prevent a
freedom of speech challenge to an architectural control ordinance.
III. PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
THE CASE FOR ARCHITECTURE
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
whether architecture is speech. However, "one finds near unanimous sup-
port in the literature among those scholars who have addressed architecture
as a protected expression question" for the idea that architecture is pro-
tected speech.7 Addressing the question of whether architecture is speech
is a separate article in itself.72 Therefore, this Comment is limited to a brief
analysis of the issues presented in order to support the assumption made in
Section IV that architecture would be accorded First Amendment protected
status.
In general, defining what constitutes expression or speech, and which
types should be protected, has been problematic. As one author noted:
"[T]he United States Supreme Court has had great difficulty both in defin-
ing the contours of [the classes of protected speech], and in applying these
contours to particular facts, even when the definitional boundaries were
66. See Williams, supra note 64, at 33 ("[T]he banks exercise a private regulatory veto. The
risk, then, is of an unusually rich property owner, indifferent to the dissipation of his wealth, who
happens also to have what the community regards as monstrous taste.").
67. Poole, supra note 44, at 339.
68. Id. at 338. Poole calls this phenomena the "community intimidation" factor. Id.; see also
Anderson, supra note 13, at 43 (stating that architectural review ordinances have persuasive pur-
poses also).
69. Poole, supra note 44, at 338.
70. See Kolis, supra note 45, at 279 ("The fact that architecture is also functional... should
be irrelevant to the threshold constitutional inquiry.") (footnotes omitted).
71. Poole, supra note 44, at 308. Poole briefly examines the issue. Id. at 307-11; see also
Kolis, supra note 45, at 278-81; Rubin, supra note 13, at 181-88.
72. Poole, supra note 44, at 307.
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considered relatively precise.""m Similarly, Justice Rehnquist stated: "In a
case where city planning commission and zoning boards must regularly
confront constitutional claims of this sort, it is a genuine misfortune to have
the Court's treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from
which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn."'74 Because the
Supreme Court lacks a principled method of deciding what is expression or
speech, it may be forced to recognize architecture as speech.75 However, no
matter how architecture is categorized, the parties bringing suit must first
have standing to sue.
A. Standing
If a landowner, developer, or architect is to be successful in a First
Amendment challenge to an architectural appearance zoning law, the
threshold requirement of standing must be met. "Protecting architecture
through a right of expression would arguably restrict the range of parties
with standing to complain of a violation."76 Builders and developers of
tract housing probably lack a sufficient personal interest to claim a frustra-
tion of their expression.77 Whether an architect lacks standing depends
upon the definition given to expression. 78 A hired architect usually molds
his work to the wishes of whomever commissioned the work.79 Nonethe-
less, "[a]n analogy may be made to the protection afforded a book: the
First Amendment will protect the author's freedom of expression whether
the book is written for the author's own benefit or commissioned for the
benefit of another individual."8
This Comment limits the issue to a challenge brought by an individual
residential landowner and/or builder with or without an architect. It is
assumed that the standing requirements can be met by at least the land-
owner. Whether an architect could claim that his commercial freedom of
73. Harold L. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic
State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 440 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
74. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
75. Lori E. Fields, Note, Aesthetic Regulation and the First Amendment, 3 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 237, 246 (1984); see Poole, supra note 44, at 308.. ("Even if a principled method is
absent, a strong case may be marshalled, based on analogy and common sense, for including
architecture within the ambit of first amendment expression.").
76. Rubin, supra note 13, at 181 n.10. Furthermore, Rubin notes that "a court could limit
protection largely to private residential architecture." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Kolis, supra note 45, at 280.81 n.25.
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speech to advertise his work product was unjustifiably infringed upon by
architectural controls will only be considered when this claim coincides
with the landowner's cause of action. Because the Court apparently
equated the degree of protection given to traditionally unprotected nonob-
scene speech, such as commercial or offensive speech, with that of tradition-
ally protected speech in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,81 the
distinction between an architect's freedom of commercial expression suit
and a landowner's offensive or political speech cause of action has been
greatly diminished,82 if not eliminated.
Architecture is not one of the traditional forms of pure speech.83 In
order to fall under the protection of the First Amendment, architecture, at
a minimum, must be nonobscene. 84 Assuming it is, architecture could con-
ceivably be classified under any one of three speech categories: artistic ex-
pression, self-expression, or symbolic and/or political expression.85 An
analysis under each category follows.
81. 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984); Quadres, supra note 73, at 443, 447.
The Supreme Court has not elevated offensive and commercial speech, but has lessened the
protection given to political speech. Id. at 447; see also Debra J. VanMark, Casenote, 22 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 567, 568-69 (1987). But see Kolis, supra note 45, at 290-91 ("Yet [architecture]
should not be subject to the stricter regulations imposed upon commercial speech for it is expres-
sion more ideological than commercial.") (footnotes omitted).
82. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779-80
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart noted:
The Court's determination that commercial advertising of the kind at issue here is not
'wholly outside the protection of' the First Amendment indicates by its very phrasing that
there are important differences between commercial price and product advertising, on the
one hand, and ideological communication on the other....
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological expression
because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services.
Id. at 779-80 (footnotes omitted); see also Quadres, supra note 73, at 447.
83. Kolis, supra note 45, at 289-90 ("Architecture expression cannot be accorded the same
protection afforded 'pure speech' since it necessarily involves some action apart from the expres-
sion.") (citations omitted).
84. Obscene expression is not protected under the First Amendment. See Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e recognize that the First
Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably
artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate .... ) (emphasis
added); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). An example of obscene architecture
would be a phallus-shaped house. Like a nuisance, this type of proposed obscene building is not
beyond all possibility, although it is highly unlikely.
85. Rubin, supra note 13, at 182-88. The analysis herein follows the form adopted by Rubin,
but differs significantly in light of United States Supreme Court interpretations of the First
Amendment since 1975.
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B. Architecture as Artistic Expression
Throughout history, architecture has been recognized as an important
art form.86 The Third Reich's use of Albert Speer's architecture for sym-
bolism and propaganda purposes is an example. 7 Architecture is similar to
artistic expression; just as a painter uses canvas or a writer uses words,"8 a
landowner, through an architect and a builder, uses brick and mortar.89
Architecture's functionalism is irrelevant to the determination of whether it
is art or artistic expression.90 Since the Court is willing to protect many
nonverbal art forms as expression91 because it can find some "serious liter-
ary, artistic, political or scientific value" in it,92 the Court certainly could
accord architecture the same recognition.93 "The Court has left vague what
constitutes 'serious artistic value.' ,94 However, one aspect of the analysis
is clear: "The effect of the art on the viewing public is probably more im-
portant than the intent of the Presenter."95 Thus, regardless of a builder's
or architect's subjective intent, architecture should be considered expression
with serious artistic value that is protected by the First Amendment.
C. Architecture as Self-Expression
When a landowner and an architect express preferences and project
images through architectural design, the architecture is self-expressive. 96
86. Kolis, supra note 45, at 278-79; see Rubin, supra note 13, at 182 & n. 11 (citing Roger
Scruton, Architectural Aesthetics, 13 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 327, 327-29 (1973)).
87. See Poole, supra note 44, at 309 & nn.104-05. The significance of architecture as art and
expression is described by Albert Elsen: "In modem times, [the influence of ancient royal archi-
tecture's] propaganda and symbolic value was revived by Mussolini and Adolph Hitler. It is clear
... that the history of architecture often mingles with history of ideas .. " Id. at 309 (quoting
ALBERT ELSEN, PURPOSES OF ART: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND APPRECIATION
OF ART 246 (2d ed. 1967)); see also Rubin, supra note 13, at 182 ("[E]very great art period pro-
duces its characteristic styles of architecture....
88. Rubin, supra note 13, at 185.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 70.
91. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live nude dancing);
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (bar-room type dancing).
92. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added); see also Williams, supra
note 64, at 23 ("[N]o particularized message need be shown to 'redeem' a work as nonobscene.
That it has serious artistic merit is sufficient.").
93. Costonis, supra note 9, at 448; Poole, supra note 44, at 308-09.
94. Rubin, supra note 13, at 183 n.17.
95. VerSteeg, supra note 39, at 469. Further, VerSteeg states: "We must ask what sugges-
tions, either overt or subliminal, the art gives to those perceiving it .... Context is undeniably
important in this analysis .... The central question, then, should be whether the art conveys a
message to the reasonable or average viewer...." Id. at 469.
96. See Williams, supra note 64, at 21.
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"[A]rchitecture is often a conscious attempt to make a meaningful aesthetic
statement. ' 97 For example, "a house's exterior appearance often expresses
the resident's personality." 98 However, not all intentional expression of
one's self is protected under the First Amendment.
The issue is not so much whether architecture is self-expression (even
Plato recognized that architecture has expressive qualities),99 but rather
whether self-expression is a recognized form of speech protected by the
First Amendment. After citing a concurrence in Roe v. Wade, 'I an author
concluded in reference to architecture that "protection for the expression of
one's personality and the development of one's interests finds legitimacy in
both the First Amendment and the related right to privacy."1"1 However, a
majority of the Court has never held this view, and today's Court is unlikely
to expand any part of Roe or the protection of self-expression." ° Therefore,
with a consensus lacking as to the viability of a purely self-expressive justifi-
cation based upon only "penumbras" in the Constitution, other classifica-
tions of speech appear to have more promise if architecture is going to be
accorded any First Amendment protection.
D. Architecture as Symbolic and Political Speech
Architecture might be classified as a form of symbolic declaration.1 °3
The Court, in United States v. O'Brien,"° rejected the view that "an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the per-
son engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." ' 5 Yet, the
97. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
98. James C. Smith, Book Review, Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose Is a Rose Is a
Rose, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 787, 802 n.45 (1990) (citation omitted) (reviewing JOHN J. COSTONIS,
ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1989)).
99. Williams, supra note 64, at 22 n.68 (citing THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 85 (B. Jowett trans.,
rev. ed. 1901)). Plato argued that architecture should be censored precisely because of its expres-
sive quality. Id.
100. 410 U.S. 113, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring), overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
101. Rubin, supra note 13, at 184-85. A distinction can be drawn between a right to privacy
inside one's home and the right to express one's individuality through the design and appearance
of the outside of one's house. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) with Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Rubin concedes in a footnote
that: "Possibly where one person's house design intrudes upon his neighbor's view, two privacy-
autonomy interests clash, and the state may have an interest in protecting the offended home-
owner." Rubin, supra note 13, at 185 n.31.
102. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (privacy right to sodomy rejected); Kelley
v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (privacy right to hair length not recognized).
103. Rubin, supra note 13, at 185 & n.32.
104. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning).
105. Id. at 376.
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Court often assumes that a particular conduct is symbolic speech.1" 6 In
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence," 7 the Court assumed that
camping in a public park was expression that fell under the First Amend-
ment.1 08 In Texas v. Johnson,'09 the Court again extended the protection of
the Free Speech Clause to nonverbal conduct (flag burning) because it car-
ried with it a significant element of symbolic expression.110 In Spence v.
Washington,"' the Court examined "the nature of the appellant's activity,
combined with the factual context and environment in which it was under-
taken," and concluded that the display of a flag with a peace sign attached
was protected expression. 1 2 Using the Spence test, the Court could hold
that architecture is symbolic expression.
The Court also might find that architecture is symbolic political speech.
Regarding architectural design, Samuel E. Poole III speculated that the
neighbors of the landowner in State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley" 3 inter-
preted a proposed pyramid-shaped home in their prestigious St. Louis sub-
urb as a political statement of rebellion against the community's traditional
values." 4 The architectural "message" was a rejection of the Western no-
tion of a stately manor keeping vigil over an estate and was a rejection of
the neighborhood."' This interpretation and the conclusion that construc-
tion of a pyramid-shape design should be protected as political expression is
difficult to accept.
Architecture is not political discourse in the same way as displaying a
flag with a peace sign," 6 wearing a black armband,1 7 or even burning an
American flag."' Architecture rarely constitutes a "particularized
106. See, eg., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (arm-
band wearing).
107. 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (camping in a public park as protest).
108. Id. at 293.
109. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
110. Id. at 406; see Smith, supra note 98, at 800-02 & n.42.
111. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
112. Id. at 409-10.
113. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
114. Poole, supra note 44, at 309.
115. Id.
116. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
117. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
118. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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message"" 9 that is common to symbolic political speech.'2 ° "Obviously,
the requirement of expressive character would be rendered meaningless if
one could meet it by simply telling people what his behavior was intended
to communicate."'' As the Supreme Court indicated in Spence, the likeli-
hood must be great that the message will be understood by those who view
it "'22 in order to fall under the protection of the First Amendment. Whether
the Court would protect architecture as symbolic or political speech is diffi-
cult to predict.
In the end, architecture may or may not be protected by the First
Amendment. 2 3 If some expressions that do not clearly contain a particu-
larized message and that "may involve only the barest minimum of...
expression" are protected,124 a strong case can be made for the protection of
architectural expression. 125 Nevertheless, a determination that architecture
is protected speech does not foretell whether a regulation or zoning law
controlling architectural appearance impermissibly abridges the First
Amendment.
119. Williams, supra note 64, at 22-23. "Moreover, the context in which a symbol is used for
purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol." Spence,
418 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted). "An intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it." Id. at 410-11. The message of architecture is not as easily under-
stood by those who view it.
120. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11; see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(display of red flag).
121. Williams, supra note 64, at 48-49 & n.186. "Because the [draft] card is small, observers
might not recognize what was being burned .. " Id. O'Brien did not clearly resolve this ambigu-
ity. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 n.1 (1968); Williams, supra note 64, at 22-23
& n.70; see also Poole, supra note 44, at 315-16. But see Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (holding that "for sale" and "sold" signs in residential areas
in New Jersey are protected by the First Amendment).
122. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
123. If Robert Bork's definition of protected speech is adopted by the Court, architectural
expression would have to be considered pure political speech to fall under the protection of the
First Amendment. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
124. Williams, supra note 64, at 23-24 (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932
(1975)).
125. At least four authors have argued that architecture should be protected expression.
Poole, supra note 44, at 307-11; Williams, supra note 64, at 21-24; Kolis, supra note 45, at 22;
Rubin, supra note 13, at 181-88.
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IV. REGULATION OF ARCHITECTURAL APPEARANCE THROUGH TIME,
PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS ON ARCHITECTURAL
EXPRESSION
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a "[s]tate may not
choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected lib-
erty." '126 Therefore, if architecture is a form of constitutionally protected
expression under any of the classifications presented in Section III, an ar-
chitectural appearance review ordinance has the potential to unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon a landowner's freedom of expression. Since
Hadacheck v. Sebastian,'27 courts have accorded zoning laws a presumption
of validity. 2 This validity principle usually places the burden on the indi-
vidual attacking the ordinance to prove its unconstitutionality.' 29 How-
ever, when a governmental act seeks to limit a First Amendment right, the
presumption usually is reversed, and the legislation is presumed to be
invalid.' 30
Depending on the categorization of an architectural appearance ordi-
nance, the presumption of the ordinance's invalidity will either continue if
the act attempts to regulate in a content-based manner,131 or it will shift
again toward a less demanding balancing of the interests involved if the
regulation is a content-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction. 132
Time, place, and manner restrictions on protected speech are weighed with
126. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976).
127. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
128. Id. at 414 (such ordinances are entitled to a presumption of validity, a presumption that
shifts the burden to the party attacking an ordinance to show its invalidity); see also Bufford, supra
note 12, at 129.
129. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). But see Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.) (zoning closely
scrutinized if economically exclusionary), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
130. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972); cf Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("I
deem it a mischievous phrase... that any law touching communication is infected with presump-
tive invalidity.").
131. "This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech
on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment." City of Renton v. Play-
time Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (emphasis added).
132. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (place restriction up-
held); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (place restriction upheld); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (place restriction upheld); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (place restric-
tion upheld); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (manner
restriction struck down); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (place restriction upheld). Clearly, if the Court adopted the time,
place, and manner restriction analysis in this case, it would not be unprecedented.
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regard to the substantial governmental interests involved, but they do not
have to overcome a presumption of invalidity and strict scrutiny by the
Court.'3 3 Therefore, in order to sustain an architectural appearance ordi-
nance, a municipality should attempt to show that its architectural appear-
ance ordinance is merely a time, place, and manner restriction on
architectural expression.'34 Whether these ordinances are content-neutral
is the first determinative issue.
A. Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on
Architectural Expression
Because architectural expression, like all expression or speech, is subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, the Supreme Court will
hold an architectural appearance ordinance valid, even though it may re-
strict some architectural expression, if the ordinance meets the three re-
quirements of the content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction test
most recently applied in Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence.'35
"Restrictions of this kind are valid provided that [1] they are justified with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech, that [2] they are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that [3] they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."'136
133. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. But see Poole, supra note 44, at 317 n.139
("The Court has imposed a higher degree of scrutiny on ordinances with aesthetic (community
appearance) purposes.") (citations omitted).
134. See, e.g., Southern Entertainment v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (holding that ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction, but that city's
failure to follow statutory notice requirements rendered it null and void.) In the alternative, even
if the Court were to reject the argument that architectural appearance ordinances only restrict on
a content-neutral basis, these ordinances would receive almost the same type of examination:
"This Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968).
The Court has apparently equated the O'Brien test with the content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction test. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8
(1984). If this is the case, the analysis herein would be the same whether architectural expression
restrictions were content-based or content-neutral. See also infra note 136.
For a discussion of four other ways to analyze zoning and First Amendment freedom of
speech conflicts, see Artigliere, supra note 17.
135. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
136. Id. (emphasis added). The Court formulated a test to define when the government may
restrict "symbolic" speech. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The test provides that a governmental
regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) the ordinance is within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free speech (Under the O'Brien
test, "unrelated to the suppression" means that a regulation must be "content-neutral."); (3) the
ZONING LAW
At first glance, an architectural appearance ordinance may appear to be
a content-based restriction on expression. It may appear that these ordi-
nances prohibit or restrict architectural designs based on the architecture's
expression. 137 Although they do treat architectural designs differently, a
closer examination of these ordinances shows that they are content-neutral
under the test currently used by the Court. 131
1. Justification Without Reference to Content: The Renton Test
The first requirement under Clark is to show the justifications for the
ordinance. The Supreme Court, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc. ' 139 established a test to determine whether an ordinance's deferential
treatment of expression is justified without reference to the expression's
content.14° The Renton justification test, as applied to architecture, is
whether the ordinance is aimed not at the content of the architectural ex-
pression, but at the secondary effects on the surrounding community. In
other words, it is whether the municipality's "predominate concerns were
with the secondary effects of" architectural expression. 1
41
The typical architectural appearance ordinance passes the Renton test.
Architectural appearance ordinances are merely a decision to treat certain
architecture differently based on whether the architecture causes harmful
secondary effects to the surrounding neighborhood. In the same way that
an architectural appearance ordinance treats certain architectural expres-
regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; and (4) the incidental re-
striction on the First Amendment freedoms is not greater than essential to the furtherance of that
interest. Id.
137. John J. Costonis, for instance, concludes summarily that "aesthetic measures that regu-
late or ban new entrants [architectural designs] are content-based restrictions, not time, place, or
manner restrictions." Costonis, supra note 9, at 447. However, he continues: "The Court might
also characterize the [design] as a hybrid of noncommunicative and communicative elements, and
... [i]f it opted for this course, it would likely invoke the time, place or manner analysis that is
used in United States v. O'Brien." Id. at 449-50.
138. This analysis adopts the method applied in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1989). As Harold L. Quadres explained: "[In Vincent,] the Court isolated each element
[of the time, place, and manner restriction test], decided whether that element posed an issue in
the case, and dealt with that issue independently of the others." Quadres, supra note 73, at 453.
139. 475 U.S. 41 (1985).
140. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). The Court examined an ordinance restricting "adult motion
picture theaters" from locating near any residential zone, church, park, or school. Id. at 44.
Under the ordinance, an adult theater was defined as a building that was used for the exhibition of
visual media that emphasized "specific sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas." Id. In
holding that the regulation was not content-based, the Court found "the Renton ordinance [to be]
completely consistent with [the] definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations," because it was
'iustified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
141. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
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sions differently, the ordinance in Renton treated differently those theaters
specializing in adult films.' 42 The Renton Court explained by quoting Jus-
tice Powell's concurring opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters: "We
have here merely a decision by the city to treat certain movie theaters differ-
ently because they have markedly different effects upon their surround-
ings."143 Architectural appearance ordinances are not necessarily aimed at
the content of architectural expressions; a community may not care what
particular design a building takes, but it is concerned with the effects that a
design will have on the neighborhood. Architectural appearance ordi-
nances are aimed at the effects of architectural design because the
predominate concern of municipalities that enact architectural controls is
the promotion of the community's general welfare.
Architectural appearance ordinances are justified by state interests in
protecting the community from the secondary effects of architecture.
Under Renton, only the predominate concern or intent of the statute is con-
sidered for purposes of the analysis.'" Therefore, if an architectural ap-
pearance ordinance includes content-based aesthetic justifications, it still
meets the content-neutral test of Renton if the content-based interests are
not the predominate justifications for the ordinance. 145
Aesthetic zoning in general, and nonresidential architectural appear-
ance regulations in particular, can be justified without reference to content
because they promote the general welfare in ways that typical residential
architectural appearance ordinances clearly do not.'46 For example, his-
toric preservation architectural appearance regulations are sometimes justi-
fied as promoting the public's general welfare interests in tourism 147 and
historical education.1 48 These justifications are inapplicable to residential
regulations unless one attempts to argue that the typical suburb has sub-
stantial tourism or historical value that warrants protection. 49
142. Id.
143. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 48. For a discussion of communities' motives in enacting zoning laws, see supra
text accompanying notes 45-50.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 162-81.
146. See Rowlett, supra note 32, at 633-38; see also Poole, supra note 44, at 292-94 (discussing
seven purposes of architectural appearance ordinances).
147. See Rowlett, supra note 32, at 633-35.
148. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 26-30; see, e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964).
149. Coral Gables, Florida, created by George Merrick in the 1920s to be "America's most
beautiful suburb," Poole, supra note 44, at 300 (citation omitted), is a possible exception. Located
just west of Miami, Coral Gables is organized into small villages, each with a different Mediterra-
nean-style architectural requirement by deed. Id. Poole examines this unique suburb as one of his
examples. Id. at 300-02.
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Residential architectural appearance ordinances typically assert two
predominate interests or concerns: protection of taxable property value and
protection and preservation of the quality of the neighborhood. For exam-
ple, the Fox Point architectural appearance ordinance's express purpose is
to avoid "a substantial depreciation in the property values of said neighbor-
hood."15 0 Similarly, Lake Forest, Illinois seeks to stop the destruction of "a
proper balance in relationship between taxable value of real property in
such areas and the cost of municipal services provided." 1 ' The Lake For-
est ordinance's specific purpose is to preserve and protect the quality and
character of the neighborhood. It seeks to avoid structures that adversely
affect "the most appropriate use, .... development," and "desirability of im-
mediate and neighboring areas." '152 Clearly, these typical ordinances are
justified without reference to architectural expression. They are content-
neutral under the Renton test and meet the first prong of the three-part
Clark test.
2. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Substantial Governmental Interests
The second part of the Clark test is whether the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve or further a significant governmental interest. 153 This re-
quirement involves two subissues: an ordinance's degree of tailoring to the
interest served and the substantiality of the state interest served by the ordi-
150. Fox POINT, Wis., ORDINANCE 129, § I (1946), quoted in State ex rel. Saveland Park
Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 265, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841
(1955).
151. LAKE FOREST, ILL., BUILDING CODE, Ch. 9, § 9.107.B (1979), quoted in Poole, supra
note 44, at 305. The Lake Forest, Illinois architectural appearance ordinance reads as follows:
Architectural Design: The City Council hereby finds that excessive similarity, dissimilar-
ity or inappropriateness in exterior design and appearance of buildings.., in relation to
the prevailing appearance of property in the vicinity thereof adversely affects the desirabil-
ity of immediate and neighboring areas and impairs the benefits of occupancy of existing
property in such areas, impairs the stability and taxable value of land and building in such
areas, prevents the most appropriate use of real estate and the most appropriate develop-
ment of such areas,. . . and destroys a proper balance in relationship between the taxable
value of real property in such areas and the cost of the municipal services provided
therefor.
Id.
152. Id. For more examples of ordinances, see supra note 46.
153. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The wording
of the final two parts of the test has varied slightly between cases. Compare City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) ([1] if an ordinance is "designed to serve a substan-
tial governmental interest"; and [2] whether it "allow[s] for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication.") with City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) ("There-
fore the critical inquires are [1] whether that interest is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect
of the ordinance on appellee's expression; and [2] whether that effect is no greater than necessary
to accomplish the City's purpose."); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
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nance. Architectural appearance ordinances are as narrowly tailored as
possible. Additionally, they serve three significant and substantial govern-
ment interests. Two are the same interests that justify architectural appear-
ance ordinances without reference to its content: the protection of property
value and the protection and preservation of the quality of the neighbor-
hood. The third substantial interest is not expressly stated by the ordi-
nances but is reflected in the name given to these ordinances: the protection
of the community's aesthetic appearance from the secondary effects of
unaesthetic architecture.
(a) Narrow Tailoring
In Schneider v. State,154 an ordinance prohibiting handbilling was justi-
fied by the public's significant interest in maintaining a litter-free aesthetic
environment. Because the Supreme Court found that the city could ade-
quately protect the aesthetic appearance of the community by punishing
those who actually littered, rather than those who attempted to speak
through handbills, it held that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored.15
In contrast, the substantive evil of architectural expression-harm to
property value, neighborhood quality, and community aesthetic interests-
is not a byproduct of architectural expression. Free speech problems in
architecture are created by the medium of expression itself because
"[a]rchitecture's unity of medium and message precludes alternate means of
expression."' 156 Architecture is more like a billboard or a campaign sign
that affects the landscape through its physical presence alone, regardless of
the content matter that it promotes.157 Architectural appearance ordi-
nances that respond precisely to the problems secondarily caused by archi-
tectural expression are narrowly tailored to restrict no more expression
than necessary to achieve their goals.
The Supreme Court has upheld ordinances that are broader in scope
than architectural appearance ordinances. For example, a majority of the
Court concluded in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 158 that a prohibi-
tion on all off-site commercial billboards was narrowly tailored to the visual
evil the city sought to correct.' 59 Further, in City Council v. Taxpayers for
154. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
155. Id. at 162.
156. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810 (allowing restrictions on campaign sign locations because of the
effect of signs, not political message contained).
157. Poole, supra note 44, at 318.
158. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
159. Id. at 508.
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Vincent,"6 the Court found that "the City did no more than eliminate the
exact source of the evil it sought to remedy," by prohibiting the posting of
all signs on public property within the city. 6 ' In comparison, prohibition
of architectural expression is more narrowly tailored to prohibit only those
structures that do not meet the requirements of the local architectural ap-
pearance ordinance.
(b) The Substantiality of the Interests Served
The Supreme Court previously sanctioned only time, place, and manner
restrictions on semi-protected speech.' 62 It has begun to accept these same
state interests as sufficient to limit any expression. 63 The Court has recog-
nized each of the interests served by municipal architectural appearance
ordinances as significant interests to be advanced by the use of the police
power. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,164 the Court not only
recognized the "interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life,"
but asserted that the interest "must be accorded high respect." 165 It ap-
provingly quoted Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc.: "There is no doubt that [the] interests furthered by
this ordinance are both important and substantial." 166 After a plurality in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego recognized a legitimate and substan-
tial state interest in pure aesthetics,167 the majority in City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent reaffirmed this interest as a substantial and significant
government interest. 68 "These cases indicate that the municipalities have a
weighty, essentially [a]esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleas-
160. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808.
161. Id. at 808-10. The Court in Vincent noted: "In Metromedia, a majority of the Court
concluded that a prohibition on billboards was narrowly tailored to the visual evil San Diego
sought to correct." Id. at 808 n.27 (citations omitted).
162. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court gave offensive but non-
obscene speech constitutional protection, but then realized that this new protected expression
would imperil certain state interests. Quadres, supra note 73, at 443 & n.19; see also FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (prohibition of indecent language on radio broadcast justified
by state interest in protecting children and unwary listeners in their homes).
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
the Court accepted "purely commercial speech as protected first amendment expression."
Quadres, supra note 73, at 445 & n.29; see supra note 81.
163. See Quadres, supra note 73, at 443-47.
164. 475 U.S. 41 (1985).
165. Id. at 50.
166. Id. at 51 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)).
167. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (plurality opinion).
168. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-05 (1984).
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ant formats for expression." 169 The Court has not explicitly held that pro-
tection of property values is a substantial government interest to be
promoted. However, the broad language of holdings such as Renton and
Vincent and the dicta in Berman v. Parker 7 0 are indicative of the Court's
willingness to follow Wisconsin's lead in State ex rel. Saveland Park Hold-
ing Corp. v. Wieland17' and recognize this specific interest as a significant
and substantial interest.
The substantiality of the community's interest in protecting the general
welfare was examined in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.'72 Jacksonville's
ordinance prohibited nudity on outdoor drive-in motion picture screens. 73
The Court held the ordinance to be an unconstitutional infringement on
speech after balancing the interests of passersby with the First Amendment
rights of the drive-in. 174 The Court reasoned that the passersby could avert
their eyes from the nudity, and therefore, the city's interests were less than
substantial. 75
In Erznoznik, the Court failed to take into account the substantial and
significant interests of the drive-in's permanent landowning neighbors. 76
As with a sound blasting from a roving truck in Kovacs v. Cooper,17 7 the
government has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome
and unavoidable intrusions, especially those that affect a captive audience
such as an individual in his home. 78 An architectural design may not of-
fend a neighbor to the degree that nudity on a full-size outdoor screen
may 17 9 or in the way a sound blasting from a truck clearly does,18 0 but in
each case homeowners are not in a position to avert his eyes (or ears) to
avoid the unwanted expression. This makes the government interest in re-
stricting architectural expression even more significant and substantial.''
169. Id. at 806.
170. 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
171. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
172. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
173. Id. at 206-07.
174. Id. at 208-18.
175. Id. at 208-12.
176. Id. at 212 n.9 ("We are not concerned in this case with a properly drawn zoning ordi-
nance restricting the location of drive-in theaters or with a nondiscriminatory nuisance ordinance
designed to protect the privacy of persons in their homes from the visual and audible intrusions of
such theaters.").
177. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
178. Id. at 86-87.
179. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
180. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 79-81.
181. In contrast, an individual may avoid the expression of the handbiller by not accepting or
reading the bill. A neighbor may not avoid the expression from a permanent neighboring house.
See generally Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
[V/ol. 76:439
ZONING LAW
Finally, the Supreme Court has addressed the situation when a munici-
pality may not be able to clearly show that its legislation actually advances
the substantial state interests. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., 82 the Court held: "The First Amendment does not require a city,
before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evi-
dence independent of that already generated by other cities, as long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant
to the problem that the city addresses." '183 Therefore, although a munici-
pality's architectural appearance review board cannot point to tangible evi-
dence that a rejected architectural design will reduce property value, lower
the quality of the neighborhood, or even destroy the aesthetic appearance of
the entire community, a court may find that the ordinance is narrowly tai-
lored to serve substantial governmental interests. Clearly, municipalities
believe that architectural appearance ordinances serve important, substan-
tial, and significant interests of the community. Two of these concerns are
expressly stated in these ordinances.18 4
In reference to the third substantial interest, protection of the aesthetics
of the neighborhood, the Court in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton '85 held:
"The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions
about what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic as-
sumptions, is not sufficient to find that statute unconstitutional." 86 Munic-
ipalities reasonably believe their assumptions about all three public welfare
interests. 187
3. The Availability of Alternative Channels for Expression
When balancing a time, place, and manner restriction, the Court not
only considers the captive audience problem inherent in architectural ex-
pression questions, but also considers the opposing side of this issue. The
third prong of the Clark time, place, and manner restriction test is whether
architectural appearance ordinances "leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information."1 88 The issue, then, is whether
182. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
183. Id. at 51-52.
184. The two were the protection of taxable real estate values and the preservation of the
quality of the neighborhood. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
185. 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (plurality opinion).
186. Id. at 62 (plurality opinion).
187. The strongest support for the reasonableness of a municipality's assumptions is the
courts. See, eg., State ex reL Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217, cerL denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
188. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
landowners who wish to express or speak through architecture have ample
alternative channels for expression.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., s9 the Court considered
whether the ordinance allowed reasonable alternative avenues of communi-
cation within the City of Renton in terms of the amount of available land
open for use as sites for the expression. 9 In the case of architectural ap-
pearance ordinances, this requirement may pose a significant problem. An
ordinance that regulates architecture because of its secondary effects may
preclude an architectural design from the entire community; a pyramid-
shaped home may be excluded city-wide. Architectural appearance ordi-
nances do not regulate architectural expression by requiring it to be concen-
trated in confined areas of the city as demonstrated in Renton,19 1 or by
dispersing it as noted in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.'92 Archi-
tectural expression is prohibited by architectural appearance ordinances
anywhere within a community where it causes substantial harm to the gen-
eral welfare of the community.
A reasonable alternative site for architectural expression is any location
that does not cause harmful secondary effects on the community. "The
First Amendment requires only that [the commuiity] refrain from effec-
tively denying ... a reasonable opportunity" to build a design. 193 Under
Renton, if a community has only five percent of its land available for expres-
sive architecture it satisfies this part of the test.1 94 It is conceivable that
there are some areas of a municipality where no property value, neighbor-
hood quality, or aesthetic appearance harms would occur no matter what
design was built. However, this alternative is unlikely. In addition, the
opposite, a subdivision of pyramid-shaped homes, is even more unlikely to
exist.
Nearby communities that lack architectural appearance controls offer
ample alternative opportunities for architectural expression. In Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim,'95 the Court stated that it "may very well be
true" that similar uses were amply available in nearby communities, but
189. 475 U.S. 41 (1985).
190. Id. at 53-54.
191. Id. at 44.
192. 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (plurality opinion).
193. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
194. Id. at 53-54 ("That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on
equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amend-
ment violation.").
195. 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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made no findings on this point. 196 If one community regulates architectural
expression through time, place, and manner restrictions, but another nearby
community does not, reasonable alternatives for expression are available. 197
If alternative sites are available, the question remains as to the degree of
availability the Court will require. As the Court said in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville,98 "each case ultimately must depend on its own specific
facts."1 99
V. CONCLUSION
Architectural appearance ordinances restrict expression through archi-
tecture. The most promising way to avoid a ruling of unconstitutionality is
for an architectural appearance ordinance to fall under the time, place, and
manner content-neutral exception. A strong case can be made that archi-
tectural appearance ordinances are merely content-neutral attempts to pro-
mote the general welfare of the community, whether it is the protection of
property value, maintenance of the community's quality, or mere aesthetic
enhancement of the overall community. They are justified without any ref-
erence to the content of architectural expressions restricted. They are nar-
rowly tailored to serve several substantial and important community
interests. With reasonable alternatives available, architectural expression
will not be suppressed; it will be restricted when outweighed by community
values.
Faced with a First Amendment challenge to an architectural appear-
ance ordinance, like the hypothetical presented in this Comment, the Court
should use the time, place, and manner test to hold that architectural ap-
pearance regulation is constitutional and a reasonable restriction on archi-
tectural expression. If it does not, a landowner may have no recourse but to
196. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76. ("[The Borough's] position suggests the argument that if there
were countywide zoning, it would be quite legal to allow live entertainment in only selected areas
of the county and to exclude it from primarily residential communities.... This may very well be
true, but the Borough cannot avail itself of that argument in this case."). But see Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939)) (" '[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' ").
197. Note, supra note 9, at 1461 ("So long as unregulated areas exist where architects may
build as they please, it is arguable that architectural nonconformity is not unduly restricted
control.").
198. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
199. Id. at 209. Because "[t]he inexperience of the Supreme Court in dealing with zoning
matters is strikingly illustrated by the.., opinion in which only four cases dealing with land use
controls were cited," prediction of the course the Supreme Court will take in this area is difficult.
Artigliere, supra note 17, at 967 n.84 (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
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sell his home at a economic loss and move away when his soon-to-be neigh-
bor successfully begins construction of a pyramid-shaped house next door.
An author concluded in 1970 with a message that is still pertinent to-
day: "What is done today in land use planning will determine the land-
scape of the future. Should we fail to act in a unified, well directed manner
in our demand for aesthetic concepts in zoning ordinances, the eyesores of
today will exist and multiply in the years to come. ' '200
SHAWN G. RICE
200. See Steinbach, supra note 19, at 186.
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